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Abstract 
The growing number of countries wishing to use nuclear energy, and the expansion in the geography of NPPs entails the risk of nuclear weapons 
proliferation, given that political leaders in some countries may want to purchase or develop sensitive nuclear technologies. A certain risk of 
proliferation through nuclear power technologies and materials cannot be excluded altogether. In the nuclear fuel cycle there are large inventories 
of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, (many hundreds and thousands of tons). The problem of spent nuclear fuel with plutonium in it, 
especially for novice countries and countries with small nuclear power program, also increases the risk of proliferation, including the growing 
risk of actions on the part of subnational or terrorist organizations because of the proliferation of nuclear technologies and materials as respective 
protection measures are insufficient in these countries. 
In the event of thermal reactors, uranium enrichment is indispensable to production of fuel. Long-term storage of SNF from thermal reactors in 
an open fuel cycle, which is a common practice nowadays, entails an increased risk of proliferation due to the weakening of the radiation barrier 
over time and the potentiality of unauthorized removal of fuel by the proliferator state and its theft by criminals and terrorists. 
Fast-neutron reactors started up and operating on plutonium fuel do not require uranium enrichment. There is no long-term storage of SNF in 
the closed fuel cycles of fast reactors. Gradual replacement of thermal reactors by fast reactors, due to natural uranium being in short supply, creates 
prerequisites for phasing out uranium enrichment. However, countries having small nuclear power programs and, therefore, a limited number of 
nuclear units will use thermal reactors still for a long time, which will require uranium enrichment. 
Creation of nuclear weapons based on energy-grade plutonium using a simpler “gun-type” design is practically impossible because of a high 
neutron background inherent in this kind of plutonium. However, this does not exclude the potentiality of terrorist attempts to fabricate a primitive 
nuclear explosive device. 
Both sensitive technologies (uranium enrichment and SNF processing with separation of plutonium) will be used to start up fast reactors on 
uranium fuel with the subsequent transition to plutonium fuel. In this case, plutonium with a small content of higher isotopes will be bred not only 
in the blanket, but also in the reactor core in much greater quantities. 
The paper considers various technological and institutional approaches to solving the problem of fast reactor blankets in terms of ensuring a 
strong proliferation resistance. 
Copyright © 2016, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by Elsevier 
B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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Tntroduction 
In more than 50 years of its existence, international nu-
lear power has come a long way of evolution and has ex-
anded worldwide. However, the underlying nuclear technolo-∗ Corresponding author. 
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his is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommies, though improved over time, remain the legacy of the mili-
ary and require careful attention to nonproliferation issues. 
The evolution of the nuclear power system and infrastructure,
ith a great deal of fissile materials being still in the system,
reates motivation and prerequisites for the peaceful material
f the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) to be used for building nuclear
eapons (NW) or stolen for making nuclear explosive devices
NED). 
The 1978 decision by the administration of the US President
. Carter to give up the processing of SNF and wind up the fast
reeder reactor program because of the alleged risk of nuclearw Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
ons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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P  proliferation from the use of plutonium in fast-neutron reactors
has been harmful to the progress of this technology both in the
USA in and some other countries. Besides (primarily owing to
the USA), there has been a negative attitude formed in the world
towards fast reactors and their NFC as being most dangerous in
terms of nuclear proliferation. At the same time, the decision by
Carter’s administration ignored the danger of proliferation from
the uranium enrichment technology. Apparently, the reason for
this was the fact that the development of the centrifuge enrich-
ment technology in the USA at the time was not successful, and
the US-designed centrifuges as such were rather cumbersome
and up to 12 m high. And the gas-diffusion technology demon-
strated at the time was introduced at large-size facilities with
much electricity and water consumed. For example, a plant in
Paducah, Kentucky, of the capacity ∼7 million SWR/started up
in 1954, consumed 22 billion kW per year, and its cooling water
consumption exceeded several-fold the water consumption by
New York’s municipal water supply system [1] . 
It was only natural to imagine then that such facility could not
be ‘hidden’ for the covert production of enriched uranium. The
success of the centrifuge technology, especially in the USSR,
small dimensions of centrifuges (no more than one meter high),
and a several-fold decrease in the consumption of electricity and
water have brought about a certain risk of high-enriched uranium
to be covertly produced. 
Problem definition 
Existing definitions of proliferation resistance 
In one of its earliest definitions, the notion “proliferation” was
used in a publication by Silvennoinen and Vira, US scientists, in
1986: “The development of the material and technical resources
required for the production of nuclear explosives in countries
that now do not have such a capability” [2] . 
Later on, the term “nonproliferation” was given a more spe-
cific meaning as applied to nuclear power systems. Thus, in the
INPRO international project, “nonproliferation” or “prolifera-
tion resistance” is defined as follows: “Proliferation Resistance
is defined as that characteristic of a nuclear energy system that
impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear ma-
terial, or misuse of technology, by States intent on acquiring
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” [3] . 
The definition of “proliferation resistance” in the Generation
IV International Forum is practically the same as in the IN-
PRO project: “Proliferation resistance is such characteristic of
a nuclear power system that impedes (prevents) the diversion
or undeclared production of nuclear material or undeclared use
of the technology by the holder state so that to possess nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. This definition is
used in the Generation IV International Forum together with
the notion of “physical protection”: “Physical protection is such
characteristic of a nuclear power system that impedes (prevents)
the theft of materials fit for nuclear explosive of radiation dis-
persing devices, as well as other acts of sabotage against plants
or transport by subnational organizations and adversaries other
than belonging to the holder state” [4] . As can be seen from the above definitions, “nonproliferation”
n both international projects is concerned with proliferation at
he state level. And in the Generation IV International Forum,
mphasis is also placed on physical protection for prevention of
otential nuclear terrorist acts by subnational organizations and
roupings other than belonging to the holder state. 
otential ways for proliferation through NFC 
Nuclear power is not the only way to creation of nuclear
eapons, at the same time, it may be easier for threshold states
o build nuclear weapons covertly, under the disguise of nuclear
ower. 
The NFC’s initial fissile materials may be processed into ma-
erials to be suitable for use in weapons at the state level or stolen
y subnational or criminal groups. 
The following steps can be made at the state level towards
he creation of nuclear weapons: 
– use of nuclear technologies, plants or nuclear power materials
for a covert military program; 
– use of the expertise and experience of nuclear experts for a
parallel covert military program; 
– withdrawal from the NPT and direct use of the NFC tech-
nologies, plants and materials for military purposes. 
At the subnational (terrorist) level, nuclear materials can be
tolen from the NFC facilities for making a primitive NED or a
dirty bomb”. 
otential increase in proliferation risk in modern conditions 
Prior to the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant in
apan in March 2011, about 40 countries declared their intent to
se atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The number of such
ountries remains large despite the accident in Japan, and, as
redicted, some 15 to 20 countries will have the first nuclear
ower units in their territories by 2030 [5] . 
The growth in the number of the countries wishing to use
uclear energy and the expansion in the NPP deployment geog-
aphy may lead to an increase in the proliferation risk because
olitical leaders in some countries may want to buy or develop
ensitive nuclear technologies. 
Recently, in connection with the intensive activities under-
aken by Iran in the direction of uranium enrichment, some coun-
ries become suspicious that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear
eapons. While neglecting the question of how justified are
uch suspicions, it should be noted that some of Iran’s neigh-
or countries have also concerns in this respect. In particular,
he Guardian , a British newspaper, said on 30 June 2011 that
audi Arabia had warned the NATO that it would seek to get
uclear weapon if it was created by Iran [6] . One may suggest
n this connection that the creation of nuclear weapons by Iran
ay trigger a “chain reaction” in the neighboring country for the
urchase(creation) of such weapons and, as the result, the ap-
earance of the whole range of threshold countries is concerned.
De-facto, the appearance of nuclear weapons in India and
akistan, tests of nuclear devices in North Korea and the disabil-
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o  ty of the international community to prevent these actions serve
n example for other unstable regimes as far as the possession
f nuclear weapons is concerned. The Nuclear Nonproliferation
reaty (NPT) seems to require to be modified to a great extent
o that countries would find it unprofitable, both politically and
conomically, to buy or develop nuclear weapons. An interna-
ional mechanism of compensations shall be developed for the
efusal to develop or possess nuclear weapons. 
For the novice states which are embarking on the way to using
tomic energy, an important dilemma will be the choice whether
o create their own nuclear power infrastructure, in particular,
or the SNF handling, or to use services from countries with
uch developed infrastructure. The problem with SNF and the
lutonium in it, especially for novice countries and the countries
ith small nuclear power programs, also leads to an increased
isk of proliferation, including a growing risk of actions on the
art of subnational or terrorist organizations because of the pro-
iferation of nuclear technologies and materials as protection
easures are insufficient in these countries. 
issile materials of nuclear power 
A risk of proliferation through nuclear technologies or ma-
erials cannot be excluded altogether. A nuclear cycle contains
uge inventories of nuclear materials amounting to many hun-
reds and thousands of tons, including fissile materials. Dozens
f kg or less is enough to make a nuclear bomb. 
Though uranium and plutonium can be used for production of
uclear explosives, they differ basically in terms of the prolifera-
ion risk reduction. The difference consists in that high-enriched
ranium may be “mechanically” diluted by low-enriched or nat-
ral uranium as the result of which it loses its capacity for a chain
ssion reaction. It is possible to restore this capacity in diluted
ranium only using technology and equipment for its enrich-
ent which are also limitedly accessible. And it is much easier
o separate plutonium from other elements it may be mixed with,
ecause this will require only chemical treatment. 
On the other hand, a neutronic comparison of uranium and
lutonium shows that, unlike uranium, plutonium h а s certain in-
erent security properties which may make NED creation more
ifficult. Such properties include natural radiation background,
eat release and radioactivity. The manifestation of these prop-
rties naturally depends on the content of certain isotopes in
lutonium. Enriched uranium also has such properties but they
re weaker by an order of magnitude than in plutonium, so they
annot have any notable effect on the NED creation. 
It also seems obvious that, unlike terrorist groups, the pro-
iferator is interested in building a “good” nuclear weapon, that
s, a weapon of a great destructive power. The creation of such
 weapon from uranium requires a technology for its enrich-
ent (or for production of uranium-233 from thorium) and a
elatively simple “gun-type” design for NED. In this connec-
ion, the problem of ensuring nuclear weapon nonproliferation
hrough a uranium enrichment technology becomes especially
cute. 
For using plutonium, it is enough to have plutonium of a
articular grade and rather a complicated explosive design ofhe implosion type. However, it cannot be definitely denied that
nergy-grade plutonium is not the target for the proliferator state
s well. 
eculiarities of fast and thermal reactors in the field of 
onproliferation 
At the present time, two technologies developed in the early
eriod of the nuclear weapon creation – uranium enrichment and
rocessing of irradiated fuel with separation of plutonium – seem
o be the most sensitive nuclear power technologies possessed by 
ew countries. It is only reasonable to suggest that an increase in
he number of the countries possessing these technologies leads
o a greater risk of nuclear proliferation. 
In the event of thermal reactors, uranium enrichment technol-
gy is indispensable to production of fuel. Long-term storage of
NF from thermal reactors in an open nuclear cycle, which is
 common practice nowadays, entails a growing risk of prolif-
ration due to the weakening of the radiation barrier over time,
nd the potentiality of unauthorized removal of this fuel by the
roliferator state or its theft by a terrorist group. 
Fast reactors started up and operating on mixed uranium-
lutonium fuel do not require a uranium enrichment technol-
gy. There is no long-term storage of SNF in a closed fuel cycle.
iven the fact that this fuel is cooled for a comparatively short
ime after it is withdrawn from the reactor, the fuel will be pro-
essed. The fact that thermal reactors are gradually replaced
y fast reactors, due to natural uranium being in shorty sup-
ly, creates grounds for uranium enrichment to be phased out.
evertheless, countries with small nuclear power programs and,
onsequently, a small number of units will use thermal reactors
till for a long time, which will require a uranium enrichment
echnology. 
Nuclear weapons with a simpler “gun-type” design cannot
e practically created based on energy-grade plutonium because
his plutonium has a high radiation background. This does not
owever rule out altogether certain attempts of making a primi-
ive NED by a group of terrorists. 
An implosion-type design requires a mature technology, tests
f certain NED components (e.g. explosive lenses)and testing of
he serviceability of the device as such. It may be suggested that
his can be done only by the proliferator state and only provided
hat the country possesses a technologically and industrially de-
eloped infrastructure. 
tartup and operation of fast reactors on plutonium 
It was early as the start of the nuclear power evolution
hat Fermi came out with an idea that the first fast reactors
ill be started on plutonium to be produced in thermal reac-
ors for peaceful nuclear applications (energy-grade plutonium).
nergy-grade plutonium has a high content of even isotopes
iving a pronounced radiation background. High content of
lutonium-238 leads to rather a high heat release, while decay
f plutonium-241 gives rise to radiological problems. 
After irradiation in a fast reactor, the fuel manufactured based
n energy-grade plutonium will contain plutonium with the
4 E.N. Avrorin, A.N. Chebeskov / Nuclear Energy and Technology 1 (2015) 1–7 
Table 1 
Changes in the plutonium isotope composition in a fast reactor. 
Isotope composition of plutonium, % 
Pu-239/Pu-240/Pu-241/Pu-242 
Equilibrium composition of plutonium, % 
Pu-239/Pu-240/Pu-241/Pu-242 
Loaded into reactor Unloaded from reactor 
100/0/0/0 89.2/10.5/0.3/0.02 59.3/31.4/5.7/3.6 
60/25/10.9/4.1 58.7/28.4/8.1/4.8 49.1/35.9/7.9/7.1 
55/20.8/17.8/5.9 57.5/24.3/11.1/7.1 53.2/33.0/7.3/6.5 
43.2/38.8/10.3/7.7 43.8/38.8/9.2/8.2 45.5/37.9/7.9/8.7 
41/40/8/11 41/40/8/11 41/40/8/11 
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e  isotope composition having no major differences from that in
the initial plutonium in fresh fuel. 
Generally speaking, the isotope composition of the plutonium
unloaded from reactors of different types and coming into the
external fuel cycle of a nuclear power system will change over
time to reach, in the long run, a certain limiting equilibrium
composition. The equilibrium composition of plutonium in the
system will be determined from the quantitative ratio of fast and
thermal reactors in the system, as well as from the produced
plutonium mixing conditions. 
The results of the calculations conducted on a BN-800 fast
reactor model are presented in Table 1. 
Therefore, thermal reactors started up and operating with plu-
tonium fuel in the reactor core generate plutonium of rather a
poor grade in terms of the use in nuclear weapons. 
It is quite different with fast reactors which have external
breeding areas, called blankets. The blankets of thermal reactors
are known to accumulate plutonium with an isotope composition
close to that of weapon-grade plutonium [7] . This poses a certain
risk of proliferation since such plutonium, having a small content
of higher isotopes and plutonium-238, may be used in weapons
actually with no prior processing. 
Apart from institutional measures, this problem can be solved
through the following: 
– joint handling and processing of spent FAs from the reactor
core and the blanket spent assemblies; 
– exclusion of pure plutonium separation in the processing of
SNF and blanket assemblies, for instance, a mixture of
50% of uranium and 50% of plutonium is separated; 
– elimination of blankets in fast reactors of export designs for
supplies to countries that do not possess nuclear weapons;
– establishment of international NFC centers. 
Export supplies of fast-reactor NPPs require that spent FAs
of the core and the irradiated blanket assemblies to be fully and
unconditionally repatriated into the supplier country. This will
require detailed monitoring of their irradiation in the reactor,
continuous control of their presence in the cooling pool, and
supervision as to the fuel repatriation into the supplier country
or into international NFC centers. 
On the one hand, the elimination of the blanket in a fast
reactor makes impossible the production of plutonium with the
isotope composition close to that in weapon-grade plutonium;
on the other hand, it leads to a reduction in the breeding factornside the fast reactor and, as a result, to the loss of additional
lutonium that could be used for further uprating both fast and
hermal reactors. 
tartup of fast reactors on enriched uranium 
In an open nuclear fuel cycle, as earlier noted, the greatest
isk of proliferation comes from the fuel enrichment technology
nd long-term storage of SNF. In a closed nuclear fuel cycle,
he greatest risk of proliferation is involved in the separated
lutonium interim storage, fresh plutonium fuel fabrication and
nsite fresh FA transportation stages. This risk is much lower
hen a technology with no pure plutonium separation is used in
he SNF processing. A limited time of the spent FA intermediate
torage and of the presence of plutonium-containing materials
n all processing stages poses the smallest possible risk. And, as
as already been noted, timely processing of SNF in the NFC
xcludes the risk of long-term SNF storage. 
In Russia, at the present time, an option is investigated for
ast reactors to be started on enriched uranium with a gradual
onversion to mixed uranium-plutonium fuel using in-house plu-
onium. This option enables fast reactors to be independent of
he presence of thermal reactor plutonium and excludes poten-
ial commissioning problems caused by limited quantities of
lutonium-based fuel. 
When fast reactors are started on uranium fuel and are fur-
her converted to mixed uranium–plutonium fuel, both sensitive
echnologies will be used: uranium enrichment and processing
f spent fuel. In this case, plutonium with a small content of
igher isotopes will be formed in much greater quantities not
nly in the blanket but also in the reactor core. 
Table 2 presents isotope compositions of plutonium gener-
ted in uranium fuel of the BN and BREST fast reactor cores.
hese compositions have been obtained based on estimates from
reliminary calculations [8,9] . 
As can be seen from the table, the content of plutonium-
39 and higher isotopes is rather close to that of weapon-grade
lutonium, excluding plutonium-238 the content of which is
bout 10 times and about 40 times as great as that of weapon-
rade plutonium for the BREST reactor and the BN reactor
espectively. 
Plutonium-238 is the major contributor to the heat release in
lutonium. A detailed analysis into the temperatures for differ-
nt models of nuclear explosives using energy-grade plutonium
E.N. Avrorin, A.N. Chebeskov / Nuclear Energy and Technology 1 (2015) 1–7 5 
Table 2 
Isotope composition of plutonium in spent uranium fuel of fast reactors. 
Reactor type Fuel burn-up Isotope composition of plutonium, % 
Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Weapon-grade Pu [6] - 0 .012 93 .8 5 .8 0 .35 0 .022 
BN-1200 with UO 2 Life 5 years 0 .4 91 .8 7 .7 0 .3 0 .02 
BREST-1200 with UN Life 5 years 0 .1 95 .5 4 .3 0 .1 0 .003 
Table 3 
Options with different plutonium-238 contents analyzed by Kessler. 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Content of Pu in 
energy-grade plutonium, % 
1 .8 3 .6 7 6 .2 
Heat release in nuclear 
charge, kW 
0 .12 0 .24 0 .46 0 .40 
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sas conducted by H. Kessler, a well-known German scientist.
he results of his latest investigations are presented in a monog-
aphy published in 2011 [10] . 
Prof. Kessler has developed, using only open information
ources, a detailed design of a nuclear explosive and has ana-
yzed the mechanism of the heat transmission from the pluto-
ium contained in the nuclear explosive to the explosive lenses
ith respect to four application options for energy-grade pluto-
ium with different contents of plutonium-238 ( Table 3 ). 
The first of the options suggests that baratol or “composition
”, employed in the early nuclear weapons, should be used as the
hemical explosive in explosive lenses. These explosive types
ave a comparatively low melting point (no more than ∼80 °C),
he achievement of which leads to the explosive lenses to be
tructurally broken. 
The second options suggests the use of an advanced chemical
xplosive with higher heat conduction and melting temperature
alues which is capable to withstand high temperatures without
osing its properties. Such explosives as DATB, HMX, PBX
011, PBX 9404, PBX 9407 andPBX, remain serviceable at
 temperature of up to ∼190 °C, and, some of them, at up to
250 °Cor even at a higher temperature. 
A conclusion is made as the result of studies using up-to-date
recision codes that the cooling of such devices (options 1 and
) does not require any special measures and will be achieved
aturally, thanks to thermal radiation and air convection. The
hemical explosive used in these devices retains its properties. 
Option 3 suggests that the item can be maintained serviceable
hanks to the nuclear charge being forcedly cooled by liquid
elium. 
Option 4 also suggests that the serviceability of an item may
e preserved by equipping all explosive lenses with rods manu-
actured of a highly heat-conductive material [7] . 
The key conclusion made by Prof. Kessler as the results of
he studies is that plutonium with the content of plutonium-238
xceeding the above values may be considered self-protected in
erms of proliferation. Therefore, when obsolete chemical explo- 
ives are used in nuclear explosive devices, it may be suggestedhat the content of plutonium-238 in the plutonium charge may
e up to 1.8% without any forced cooling devices. When up-
o-date explosive substances are used, the content of plutonium-
38 in the plutonium charge may reach 3.6% also with no forced
ooling measures taken. It should be noted that approximately
uch concentrations of plutonium-238 are achieved in the ura-
ium SNF of light-water reactors when the fuel burnup reaches
3 and 60 GW • day/t. 
Therefore, an increased content of plutonium-238 in spent
uel of fast reactors started on uranium cannot be looked upon
s a technological barrier when such plutonium is used in nuclear
eapons. 
ranium enrichment and nuclear nonproliferation 
roblem 
In connection with the development of the option suggesting
he fast reactor startup on uranium fuel, the nuclear nonpro-
iferation problem was studied as the result of which the fol-
owing main conclusion has been made: the proliferator state,
aving obtained the enrichment technology by any way, will try
o materialize its intent of coming into the possessing of nuclear
eapons through the production of uranium with a sufficiently
igh enrichment, since the following is required: 
– a comparably small amount of fissile material, which leads
to a “faster” device and, as a rule, to a large energy yield
during an explosion; 
– a smaller amount of initial material (natural uranium); 
– a smaller amount of separation work (SWU); 
– a shorter time. 
To assess the suitability of fissile material for the manufac-
uring of nuclear weapons or a primitive NED, the notion or the
actor of material attractiveness is introduced. This notion is an
mportant part of the existing technologies used to assess the
esistance of the commercial NPP NFCs to diversion or theft
f nuclear materials [11] . The enriched uranium attractiveness
unction looks as follows 
(x) = mod [ 1 . 8 · ( 2x − 1 ) · 1n [ x/ ( 1 − x ) ] − 0. 90 ] . 
By substituting the uranium enrichment value х , we will get
he respective attractiveness values. Fig. 1 presents a diagram of
he function А( х ). 
And where fuel of nuclear reactors is used as the initial ma-
erial instead of natural uranium, HEU will be produced with
maller quantities of the initial material and SWU and for a
horter time. 
6 E.N. Avrorin, A.N. Chebeskov / Nuclear Energy and Technology 1 (2015) 1–7 
Fig. 1. Enriched uranium attractiveness function. 
Table 4 
Initial material and SWU quantities for HEU production. 
Initial material for HEU production 
Natural uranium Thermal reactor uranium fuel Fast reactor uranium fuel 
0 .711% of uranium-235 4% of uranium-235 15% of uranium 235 20% of uranium-235 
Initial material mass 4 .4 t 590 kg 150 kg 10 kg 
SWU quantity 5 .7 × 10 3 1 .8 × 10 3 750 500 
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 Table 4 presents selected comparative estimates for the pro-
duction of 25 kg of uranium with an enrichment of 90%, if fresh
uranium-based fuel of thermal reactors or fast reactors is used as
the initial material. These estimates assume 0.2% of uranium-
235 in the enrichment facility dumps. 
It can be seen that the use of nuclear reactor fuel as the initial
material for the HEU production leads to a greatly decreased
demand for the initial material and SWU, which is expressed in
a major reduction in the production time. When fuel of nuclear
power reactors is used, two or one FAs will be essentially enough
to have the initial material for producing HEU in one notable
quantity (the approximate quantity of nuclear material, for which
the potentiality of the nuclear explosive manufacturing cannot
be excluded with the ureanium-235 enrichment exceeding or
being equal to 20%, is 25 kg of uranium-235 [12] ). 
Since the potential proliferator is not expected to be saving
much when producing HEU, it may afford a greater content of
uranium-235 in the enrichment tailings, this leads to a smaller
demand for SWU, and, therefore, reduces the HEU production
time, but, on the other hand, requires more initial material. 
It may be therefore suggested that supplies of enriched nu-
clear fuel to other countries involve a potential risk of this fuel
to beg used as the initial material for obtaining high-enriched
material. onclusion 
Fast reactors started and operating on mixed uranium-
lutonium fuel do not require a uranium enrichment technology.
here is no long-term storage of SNF in a closed fuel cycle. 
It is high time that fast reactors to be relieved of an unfair label
s the most dangerous facilities in terms of the nonproliferation
roblem. Until now, all weapon-grade plutonium was produced
lobally in thermal reactors, and there is no reliable information
hat any notable quantity of it was produced in fast reactors. 
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